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What’s Left of the Affordable
Care Act? A Progress Report
Helen Le v y , A n dr e w Ying, a n d Nichol a s Bagley
Cl!)

We assess the progress of the Affordable Care Act a decade after it became law. Although most of it remains
intact, some parts have been repealed and others have not been implemented as expected. We review how
and why the law has aged. Legal challenges have done less damage than is commonly appreciated, with the
exception of the Supreme Court case that thwarted full expansion of Medicaid. Most of the important changes
have other sources. Some parts were born to fail. Others were dismantled in response to interest-group pressure. Still others have failed to thrive for any number of reasons. Finally, the sabotage campaign by the Trump
administration has had modest effects so far, but could pose a serious threat in the coming years.
Keywords: Affordable Care Act, Medicaid expansion, health care

After a decade, what is left of the Affordable
Care Act (ACA)? The question is more difficult
to answer than it might seem. The ACA is a remarkably complex statute, which partly reflects
the complexity of the health-care system it
aimed to reform. But it also reflects the broad
scope of the law, hundreds of provisions touching on every aspect of that system—and some
having no connection to health care at all. Reports on implementation tend to focus, understandably, on high-profile provisions such as
coverage expansions or delivery-system reform
(Blumenthal and Collins 2014; Obama 2016).
These high-level reviews, however, overlook

scores of other provisions that are important
in their own right. The ACA has also been under
siege from the moment it was enacted, and its
Republican opponents have notched some victories in their campaign against it (Oberlander
2017).
Those victories, combined with genuine setbacks, have fostered the view in some quarters
that most of the law has been dismantled. The
well-regarded Kaiser Health Tracking Poll reported in May 2017 that one-quarter of the
American public either believed the ACA had
been repealed or were unsure whether it was
still in effect (Kirzinger et al. 2017a). In Septem-

Helen Levy is research professor at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. Andrew Ying
is a medical student at Johns Hopkins University. Nicholas Bagley is professor of health law and regulatory
theory at Michigan Law at the University of Michigan.
© 2020 Russell Sage Foundation. Levy, Helen, Andrew Ying, and Nicholas Bagley. 2020. “What’s Left of the
Affordable Care Act? A Progress Report.” RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences 6(2):
42–66. DOI: 10.7758/RSF.2020.6.2.02. Direct correspondence to: Helen Levy at hlevy@umich.edu, Institute for
Social Research, University of Michigan, 426 Thompson St., Ann Arbor, MI 48106; Andrew Ying at aying1@jhmi.
edu, School of Medicine, Johns Hopkins University, 733 N. Broadway, Baltimore, MD 21205; and Nicholas Bagley
at nbagley@umich.edu, University of Michigan Law School, 625 South State St., Ann Arbor, MI 48109.
Open Access Policy: RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences is an open access journal.
This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.

w h at’s lef t of t he a ffor da ble ca r e act?

ber 2017, the Kaiser poll reported that half of
the public thought the ACA marketplaces were
“collapsing” (Kirzinger et al. 2017b). President
Donald J. Trump has suggested on more than
one occasion that the ACA is dead: “some people would say, essentially, we have gotten rid”
of the law (Rappaport 2018; see also Savransky
2017).
But is that right? If not, just how wrong is it?
In this article, we assess the status of the most
significant provisions of the ACA. In particular,
we identify those parts that have been repealed,
invalidated, or abandoned, and offer a thematic
framework for understanding the pressures
that have buffeted the ACA in its first decade.
Legal challenges are part of the story, but they
have inflicted less harm than is commonly appreciated, with the exception of the Supreme
Court case that thwarted full expansion of Medicaid. Most of the other major changes to the
ACA have had different sources: some parts of
the law were born to fail; others were repealed
under intense pressure from interest groups;
still others failed to thrive for a grab bag of reasons. And today, of course, the Trump administration is working to undermine or eliminate
some parts of the ACA.
Three broad conclusions emerge from this
overview. First, despite the partisan campaign
to undo the ACA, the large majority of the law
has been successfully implemented, often without much publicity. Second, many parts that
have not been implemented, or that have been
implemented slowly, were not the victims of Republican attacks. Repeated delays of some of
the law’s revenue-raising and budget-cutting
provisions, for example, have received bipartisan support. It was the Barack Obama administration that declared unfeasible an entire title
of the original ACA—the CLASS Act—as early
as 2011. Third, President Trump’s attempt to
use executive power to sabotage the ACA has
been only modestly successful so far, and some
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of his administration’s most significant initiatives have been held up in lawsuits. The outcome of those cases, and the coming presidential election, will matter enormously for the
future of the ACA.
Methods

We begin with a quantitative analysis of key
provisions of the ACA. At the outset, however,
we caution readers against placing too much
weight on the numerical estimates. First,
counting which provisions have and have not
been implemented does not account for their
relative importance. Second, we do not evaluate
each of the hundreds of sections and thousands of provisions of the ACA.1 Instead, the
subset of provisions consists of those that John
McDonough (2011) designated as “key” shortly
after the law was adopted. These 199 provisions
span all of the ACA and range from relatively
minor to major in both size and significance.2
In our analysis, we sought to determine the
degree to which each provision has been implemented. Our analysis is inherently subjective
and our goal therefore is to be as transparent
as possible so that readers can make their own
judgments. All sources of information used to
determine implementation and outcome progress are publicly available and include federal
regulations (as published on Federalregister.
gov), Congressional Research Service reports,
government webpages, and peer-reviewed journal articles. After making a qualitative judgment, we assigned a quantitative rating to each
provision based on the degree to which it was
implemented (0 = not implemented; 1 = partially implemented; 2 = all or virtually all of provision implemented).3 We also experimented
with a more complicated five-category rating
system, but because the summary results were
virtually identical to those reported here, we
use the simpler three-category rating system.
We omit from our analysis several provisions

1. Table A1 presents a timeline of key events both before and after the law’s passage.
2. Our analysis categorizes provisions in Title X of PPACA (the Manager’s Amendment) and ACA-relevant provisions of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA) with the relevant provisions in Title
I through IX of PPACA. For example, we group the tax on tanning salons (which was in Title X) and the change
in the tax treatment of cellulosic biofuels (which was in HCERA) with the other revenue provisions in Title IX.
3. Our ratings and the sources on which we relied to evaluate each provision are available online as supplementary material (see https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/6/2/42/tab-supplemental).
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that required no implementation; for example,
Section 6801, which “conveys the sense of the
Senate that health reform presents an opportunity to address issues related to medical malpractice and medical-liability insurance” and
that “states should be encouraged to develop
and test alternative models to the existing civil
litigation.” Finally, we omitted several provisions because we could find no evidence on
their implementation status, such as Section
6402(a), which directs “the Secretary [of the Department of Health and Human Services] to enter into data-sharing agreements with the Commissioner of Social Security, the VA and DOD
Secretaries, and the IHS Director to help identity fraud, waste, and abuse.”
No obvious natural scaling applies to the importance of the provisions that we surveyed. To
get an overall implementation score for each
title, we simply average the zero-to-t wo measure across that title’s key provisions and express the result divided by two as a fraction. For
example, a title with two provisions, one of
which was fully implemented and the other of
which was partially implemented, would have
an overall score of 0.75 (= [0.5*2 + 0.5*1]/2).
When possible, we present additional quantitative metrics of the extent to which a title’s provisions have been implemented. For example,
in Title IX: Revenue Provisions, we use the original estimates from the Joint Committee on
Taxation (JCT) of the amount of revenue each
provision in Title IX was projected to raise to
calculate what proportion of the projected revenue is attributable to provisions that have
been implemented. Finally, we calculate an
overall score for the ACA that takes into account
the relative importance of each title by using the
original projection of the spending and revenue
associated with each title from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) as a weight in averaging
implementation scores across titles (CBO 2010).
We discuss the implementation of key provisions title by title, offering brief descriptions of
what was implemented successfully and what
was not in order to provide context for the
quantitative scores.
After completing the quantitative analysis,

we developed five categories that broadly capture the various reasons why some provisions
were not implemented. These categories are legal challenges, born to fail, interest-group pressure, failure to thrive, and executive-branch
sabotage.
AC A I m p le m e n tat i o n Ti t le by Ti t le

Measured using our rough quantitative score,
we find that 83 percent of the ACA has been
implemented as written (see table 1). Here, we
review the content of the ACA and the progress
of implementation title by title.
Title 1: Quality, Affordable Health Care for All
Americans. The largest title of the ACA, measured in number of key provisions or in total
spending and revenue, Title I focuses on the
private health insurance sector. It includes
forty-nine provisions, $509 billion in spending, $81 billion in revenue, and is 88 percent
implemented. These provisions represented a
revolution in the nongroup market and a
much smaller but still substantial change for
employer-sponsored coverage. Title I includes
high-profile provisions such as the creation of
health insurance marketplaces, premium tax
credits, employer and individual mandates,
community rating requirements, and the ban
on lifetime caps on coverage, among others.
With some exceptions, such as the individual
mandate, most of these provisions have been
implemented as written. As of 2019, 11.4 million Americans are covered by marketplace
health insurance plans, down slightly from the
peak of 12.7 million in 2016 (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2019).
Title II: The Role of Public Programs. Medicaid
expansion in the Affordable Care Act—which
includes seventeen provisions, $459 billion in
spending, $53 billion in revenue, and is 78 percent implemented—was meant to cover all
adults ages nineteen through sixty-four living
in families with income below 138 percent of
the federal poverty level on January 1, 2014. Instead, a Supreme Court ruling rendered this
expansion effectively optional for states.4 Table
2 shows the dates on which different states have
implemented expansion and the proportion of

4. Evaluating the Medicaid expansion raises the question of whether we are asking “was the provision implemented according to the law,” taking into account that the law was changed as a result of the subsequent Su-
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Table 1. Overview of ACA Implementation by Title

Number
Average
of Key
Implementation
Provisions
Score
I. Quality, Affordable Health Care for All
Americans (private coverage expansion)
II. Role of Public Programs (Medicaid
expansion)
III. Improving the Quality and Efficiency
of Health Care (Medicare payments
changes)
IV. Prevention of Chronic Disease and
Improving Public Health
V. Health Care Workforce
VI. Transparency and Program Integrity
VII. Improving Access to Innovative
Medical Therapies
VIII. CLASS Act
IX. Revenue Provisions
Total

CBO/JCT Projection,
2010–2019
($ Billions)
Spending

Revenue

49

0.88

509

81

17

0.78

459

53

35

0.96

54

450

19

0.85

18

1

9
43
7

0.94
0.90
1.00

18
3
0

0
7
7

1
19

0.00
0.79

0
0

70
438

199

0.83

1,061

1,107

Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: Key provisions are as defined in McDonough 2011. Projections adapted from McDonough (table 1,
106). The CBO (2010) projection also includes another $78 billion in savings from program interactions,
not attributable to a single title. Weighted average across all titles using (spending + revenue) as weight.

the population of poor adults ages nineteen
through sixty-four living in those states.
Twenty-four states plus the District of Columbia chose to expand Medicaid on or before January 2014; these states contained about half of
the target population of low-income non-
elderly adults. Additional states implemented
Medicaid expansion in the years just after 2014
or are now in the process of doing so. As of 2019,
64 percent of the adults in the expansion population live in states in which Medicaid expansion has been implemented or in which implementation is pending. It is thus reasonable to
say that about two-thirds of this important
component of the law has been achieved.
Title III: Improving the Quality and Efficiency
of Health Care. Title III includes thirty-five key
provisions, $54 billion in spending, $450 billion
in revenue, and is 96 percent implemented. Its

key provisions are intended to improve the
quality of care (or at least not degrade it) while
reducing federal payments, an effort broadly
described as delivery-system reform. The provisions included large cuts in Medicare payments
to Medicare Advantage plans and to hospitals;
together, CBO scored these cuts as achieving
$290 billion in savings over the 2010 to 2019
scoring window. The cuts, like most of the key
provisions of Title III, have been implemented
as planned. In addition to (relatively) simple
spending cuts, Title III expanded quality measurement and value-based purchasing initiatives, and also created the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Innovation to facilitate the development and diffusion of innovations in Medicare policy (Rocco and Kelly 2020). Title III introduced innovative payment models for
Medicare such as the Shared Savings Program,

preme Court ruling; or “was the provision implemented as it was written?” Our goal is to answer the latter
question, so in the case of Medicaid expansion, we conclude that it was only partially implemented.
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Table 2. Growth of Medicaid Expansion

Expansion Date
≤ 2014

2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Enacted but not yet
implemented
Non-expansion as of 2019

States
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New York,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia
Michigan, New Hampshire
Alaska, Indiana, Pennsylvania
Louisiana, Montana
—
Maine, Virginia
Idaho, Nebraska, Utah
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi,
Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin,
Wyoming

Cumulative Fraction
of Poor Adults in
Expansion States
0.48

0.52
0.58
0.60
0.60a
0.62a
0.02a
0.36a

Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2014 through 2017 data from the American Community Survey
plus additional information from the Kaiser Family Foundation (2020).
Note: Adults are defined as those ages nineteen through sixty-four.
a
Projection based on 2017 population.

which spurred the growth of accountable care
organizations, and expanded pilot projects of
bundled payments. It remains unclear whether
these initiatives will succeed in “bending the
curve” of health-care spending, but they are
still in place. The most significant Title III provision that has not been implemented is the
Independent Payment Advisory Board, which
we discuss in more detail later.
Title IV: Prevention of Chronic Disease and Improving Public Health. This title includes $18 billion in spending and $1 billion in revenue, and
is 85 percent implemented. It includes a variety
of provisions, nineteen in all, related to public
health. The most significant of these, at least
in terms of planned federal expenditures, was
the creation of the Prevention and Public
Health Fund. Other key provisions include nutrition labeling for restaurant menus, which
happened slowly; a requirement that large
firms provide break time and lactation space
for employees who are nursing mothers; and a

smorgasbord of relatively small grant programs
to promote public health.
Title V: Health Care Workforce. This relatively
brief title of the ACA, which includes $18 billion
in spending and zero revenue, included some
grant programs and changes to residency program rules. Eight of its nine key provisions—
94 percent—were implemented. The ninth established a National Health Care Workforce
Commission, and members were appointed in
September 2010. Congress, however, never appropriated the money for the commission,
which has therefore never met (Buerhaus and
Retchin 2013).
Title VI: Transparency and Program Integrity.
This title includes $3 billion spending and $7
billion in revenue, and is 90 percent implemented. Among its forty-three key provisions,
it includes a variety designed to prevent fraud,
including the creation of provider data banks
for Medicare and Medicaid. It also includes a
number of key provisions that could have been

w h at’s lef t of t he a ffor da ble ca r e act?

enacted independently but were instead enacted as part of the ACA, perhaps because they
yield net revenue. (This is true of Titles VII and
VIII as well.) Its standalone policies include the
Elder Justice Act, intended to prevent abuse,
neglect, and exploitation of older Americans;
the Physician Payments Sunshine Act, which
requires pharmaceutical companies and drug
manufacturers to report payments to physicians; and the creation of the Patient-Centered
Outcomes Research Institute.
Title VII: Improving Access to Innovative Medical Therapies. Including seven key provisions,
this title entails zero spending and $7 billion in
revenue. Fully implemented, it has accomplished two things. First, it adopted the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of
2009 (BPCI Act), intended to create a simplified
path for the approval of “biosimilar” therapies—essentially, generic versions of biological
products approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). This provision was faithfully implemented by the FDA but has not lived
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up to expectations. Title VII also expanded the
340B Drug Pricing Program in Medicaid, effectively increasing the number of hospitals that
receive drug rebates from manufacturers.
Title VIII: Community Living Assistance Services and Supports. This title has only one key
provision, includes zero spending and a stated
$70 billion in forecast revenue, and was not implemented. The CLASS Act, as it was known,
was intended to create an insurance-like program that would cover expenses for services required to help disabled individuals remain living in the community rather than having to
move to a nursing home.
Title IX: Revenue Provisions. Revenue provisions in the ACA, nineteen in all, were projected
to raise $438 billion between 2010 and 2019 (CBO
2010). Table 3 summarizes the provisions, the
revenue projection associated with each, and
the extent to which—79 percent—they have
been implemented; figure 1 summarizes this information graphically. The largest of these revenue provisions, by far, were two new Medicare-

Table 3. Implementation of ACA Revenue Provisions

Provision
Medicare tax
Health insurance fee

Projected
Revenue
($ Billions),
2010–2019 (JCT)

Cadillac tax

32.0

Drug fee
Cellulosic biofuel
Medical devices
1099 reporting requirement
Change medical deduction
threshold
FSA capped at $2,500
Change definition of medical
spending for HSAs and so on
Eliminate Part D deduction
Codification of economic
substance doctrine
Tanning tax

27.0
23.6
20.0
17.1
15.2

Implemented as written
Implemented but then
suspended in CY2017
Delayed repeatedly (currently
2022)
Implemented as written
Implemented as written
Moratorium started Jan 1, 2016
Repealed 2013
Implemented but then changed

13.0
5.0

Implemented as written
Implemented as written

1.00
1.00

4.5
4.5

Implemented as written
Implemented as written

1.00
1.00

2.7

Implemented as written

1.00

Total

210.2
60.1

Status as of 2019

Fraction
of Projected
Revenue
Implemented

439.9

Source: Authors’ calculations plus JCT projections.

1.00
0.41
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.37
0.00
0.34

0.75
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Figure 1. ACA Revenue Projections
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related taxes on high-income individuals, one
of which increased the tax rate on earnings and
the other of which imposed a new 3.8 percent
tax on unearned income. (Interestingly, only
the former of those actually goes to the Medicare Trust Fund.) These two provisions were responsible for just over half of the projected new
tax revenue in the ACA—and both have been
implemented as written. Many smaller revenue
provisions, such as capping contributions to
flexible spending accounts at $2,500 and a tax
on tanning salons, have also been fully implemented. Other revenue provisions, however,
have not. Indeed, one related to tax reporting
requirements was the first element of the ACA
to be repealed, thirteen months after the law
was passed. Others—including a tax on health
insurers and medical device manufacturers, as
well as the Cadillac tax—have been repeatedly
suspended or delayed. Indeed, as of this writing, news reports indicate that all three of those
taxes may be repealed as part of an end-of-2019
budget deal (Sullivan 2019).
In all, the suspensions, delays, and repeals
wiped out provisions that were projected to raise
about a quarter of the $440 billion in revenue.
Nonetheless, the other (revenue-projection-

weighted) three-quarters of provisions have
been implemented.
Th e m at ic Fr a m e wo r k

Running though the ACA’s titles offers a sense
of the law’s scope and complexity, as well as
of the relatively small number of its provisions
that have been invalidated, repealed, or abandoned. The raw description, however, obscures the reasons that the ACA has evolved as
it has. Here we offer a loose thematic framework for understanding that evolution, examining legal challenges, parts of the ACA that
were born to fail, interest-group pressure, a
catch-all category for provisions that have not
lived up to expectations for various reasons,
and executive-branch sabotage. Table 4 presents examples of provisions in each category.
We view these categories as a work in progress;
the law is still evolving and will evolve still further in the coming years (witness the ongoing
legal challenges). A generalizable analysis of
why some provisions fail (Patashnik and Zelizer 2013), or of whether the ACA’s implementation reflects policy retrenchment (Hacker
2004), awaits the resolution of that ongoing
uncertainty.
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Table 4. ACA Provisions Not Implemented: Themes and Examples
Category

Examples

1. Legal challenges

Medicaid expansion
Cost-sharing reductions
Contraceptive coverage

2. Born to fail

1099 reporting provision
CLASS Act
Co-ops

3. Interest group pressure

Cadillac tax
Medical device tax
IPAB
DSH cuts
Free Choice vouchers
Menu labeling

4. Failure to thrive

Multistate compacts
Multistate plans
Biosimilars
Antidiscrimination rules
Prevention and Public Health Fund

5. Executive branch sabotage

Zeroing out the individual mandate
Medicaid work requirements
Short-term, limited duration insurance
Association health plans

Source: Authors’ tabulation.

Legal Challenges

Thwarted in their efforts to prevent the ACA’s
adoption, its opponents sought to undo the law
in the courts. Over ten years, they filed dozens
of lawsuits challenging various aspects of the
ACA and its implementing regulations (see table 5). Although most of these cases were unsuccessful, a handful have fundamentally reshaped the law. More recently, ACA supporters
have enlisted the courts to forestall Trump administration efforts to undermine the law.
By far the most significant change to the
ACA came in 2012, with the Supreme Court’s
decision in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).5 The case was lauded
at the time as a victory for the Obama administration, and in some respects it was. Four conservative justices wanted to invalidate the entire statute because they believed Congress
lacked the power to adopt the individual mandate. But the chief justice balked, and the Court

held, by a 5–4 vote, that Congress had the power
to impose the individual mandate under the
taxing clause. The ACA’s reforms to the individual and employer-sponsored markets were
thus constitutionally secure.
In another respect, however, NFIB was a calamity for the ACA. In a ruling as novel as it
was unexpected, the Supreme Court held, by a
7-2 vote, that Congress lacked the power to condition the continuing receipt of traditional
Medicaid on the adoption of the Medicaid expansion. Doing so was unconstitutionally coercive—“a gun to the head” of the states. As a
remedy, the Court concluded that the federal
government could not “withdraw existing Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in the expansion.”
Measured against the remedy that the
Court’s most conservative justices would have
preferred—the complete invalidation of the
ACA—this again looked like a victory. But the

5. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).

134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014)
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2014)
760 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
762 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2014)
772 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2014)
783 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2015)

130 F.Supp.3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015)
827 F.3d 81 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
227 F.Supp.3d 660 (N.D. Tex. 2016)

King v. Burwella

Sissel v. HHS

Coons v. Lew

Mayhew v. Burwell

Johnson v. OPM

House v. Burwell

West Virginia v. HHS

Franciscan Alliance v. Burwella

Held that (1) the individual mandate was constitutional pursuant to Congress’s
power to tax and (2) that the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutionally
coercive, effectively rendering the expansion voluntary
Rejected claims that the individual and employer mandates violated the
plaintiffs’ religious freedom
Held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act does not allow HHS to
require closely held corporations to provide contraception to their employees
Sustained the legality of an IRS rule extending subsidies to individuals who
live in states that declined to establish their own exchanges
Rejected the argument that the ACA was wholly unconstitutional because it
violated the Origination Clause
Dismissed as unripe an attack on the IPAB as an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power
Rejected the argument that the ACA’s “maintenance of effort” rules for
Medicaid are unconstitutionally coercive under NFIB v. Sebelius
Held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the “Hill fix,” OPM’s rule
permitting members of Congress and their staff to use ACA subsidies to
purchase exchange coverage
Held that Congress never appropriated the funds necessary to make costsharing payments
Dismissed on standing grounds a state’s effort to challenge the delay of some
of the ACA’s insurance rules
Entered a nationwide injunction against the implementation of an HHS rule
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity and pregnancy
status

132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012)

Burwell v. Hobby Lobbya

Description

Key Citation

733 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 2013)

a

Liberty University v. Lew

NFIB v. Sebelius

Name

Table 5. Significant Litigation over the ACA

312 F.Supp.3d 1164 (D.N.M. 2018)
892 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
18-2364 (D. Maryland)
340 F.Supp.3d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2018)

351 F.Supp.3d 1267 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
142 Fed. Cl. 38 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2019)

New Mexico Health Connections v. HHS
Moda Health Plan v. United Statesa

Columbus v. Trump

Texas v. United States

California v. HHSa

Common Ground Healthcare Cooperative
v. United Statesa
New York v. DOL

366 F.Supp.3d 125 (D.D.C. 2019)

2019 WL 3253913 (D.D.C. 2019)

Enjoined the EEOC’s implementation of portions of the ACA pertaining to
wellness programs
Rejected a state’s effort to compel the Trump administration to continue
making cost-sharing payments
Invalidated the risk adjustment program as arbitrary and capricious
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Supreme Court’s decision transformed the
stakes of the expansion decision for the states
and, in so doing, distorted how the ACA was
supposed to work (Sunkara and Rosenbaum
2016). Instead of forcing states to pick between
an expanded Medicaid program and no Medicaid at all, the Supreme Court allowed states to
pick between the status quo and the Medicaid
expansion. Expansion was still tempting: the
federal government picked up 100 percent of
the expansion’s costs from 2014 to 2016, which
dropped gradually to 90 percent in 2020. But
states were free to decline the money if they
wished.
Many did. About half of the states declined
to expand their Medicaid programs as of January 1, 2014; nearly six years later, fourteen states
have refused to expand. Most are in the South
and Midwest, and include the major population
centers of Texas, Florida, Georgia, and North
Carolina. As a result, millions are uninsured
who would have been covered had the ACA
been left intact. A litany of studies has documented the adverse effects of not expanding
Medicaid on coverage rates, access to care, financial stability, self-reported health outcomes, hospital budgets, and state budgets
(Antonisse et al. 2018). One recent study estimates that “approximately 15,600 deaths would
have been averted had the ACA expansions
been adopted nationwide as originally intended by the ACA” (Miller et al. 2019).
Apart from the constitutional challenge to
Medicaid expansion, however, constitutional
attacks on the ACA have not fared well. The circuit courts have brushed aside arguments that
the ACA violated the Origination Clause, that
the employer and individual mandates infringe
on religious freedom, that Congress impermissibly delegated its lawmaking powers, and that
a provision preventing states from changing
their Medicaid programs is unconstitutionally
coercive (see table 5).
Three sets of statutory challenges to the ACA
have gained more traction. The first, which culminated in King v. Burwell,6 involved a challenge
to an Obama administration rule that made
premium subsidies available nationwide. The
6. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 988 (2014).
7. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014).

challengers in King seized on a snippet of the
ACA’s text that, read literally, would have offered premium subsidies to people in the one-
third of states that set up their own exchanges,
and not in the two-thirds that defaulted to the
federally operated exchange. Over a three-
justice dissent, the Supreme Court turned back
the challenge, holding that adopting the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the statute would conflict
with the legislative plan. But the vote was closer
than commonly appreciated—both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy were apparently on the fence after argument (Biskupic
2019, 291)—and the ACA only narrowly avoided
a blinkered construction that would have led
to massive state-to-state variations in exchange
coverage.
The second set of legal challenges involved
the “contraception mandate.” Technically, the
ACA itself imposes no such mandate. It instead
requires health plans to cover “preventive care
and screenings” for women “as provided for in
comprehensive guidelines” issued by a Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
subagency. But it surprised no one when the
Obama administration announced that such
preventive care included contraception. Since
that announcement, religious organizations
have filed a number of lawsuits challenging the
contraception mandate. In Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby,7 the Supreme Court held that, under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a privately
held corporation need not provide contraception to its employees. Subsequent cases have
also cast doubt on the legality of an Obama administration effort to accommodate the concerns of religious nonprofits.
Although Hobby Lobby and related cases
loom large in the culture wars, they have had
modest real-world effects. In 2015, only sixty-
three employers availed themselves of the
Obama administration’s accommodation for
religious employers—and, per that accommodation, their employees still received contraception coverage, albeit without their employer’s involvement (HHS 2018c, 57575). The
Trump administration has now issued rules to
fully exempt any employer voicing religious or
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“moral” objections to the mandate. Even under
those rules—which, for now, have been enjoined by the courts—only an estimated 109
employers, covering perhaps 727,000 people,
would drop contraception coverage altogether
(HHS 2018c, 57578). The vast majority of U.S.
employers adhere to the contraception mandate, and the vast majority will continue to do
so, Hobby Lobby notwithstanding.
The third case is House v. Burwell, a challenge brought by the Republican-controlled
House of Representatives to the Obama administration’s issuance of billions of dollars in
cost-sharing payments. A crucial ACA funding
stream, these payments are meant to reimburse insurers for adhering to ACA rules that
require them to limit the out-of-pocket costs
of their low-income enrollees. The judge hearing the case held that the House had standing
to sue and that, on the merits, the House was
right: Congress never appropriated the money
to make the cost-sharing payments. Although
the Court allowed the payments to continue
while the administration pursued an appeal,
the 2016 election threw the status of the cost-
sharing payments into doubt. After unsuccessfully trying to use the threat of cutting off cost-
sharing payments to force Democrats to
negotiate over a plan to repeal and replace the
ACA, President Trump scrapped the payments
in October 2017.
The funding cutoff was partly a response to
an adverse court decision, but it also capitalized on a glaring oversight by the ACA’s drafters. Regardless, insurers found a way to cope.
Working with state insurance regulators, they
have channeled low-income enrollees into silver plans and then increased the premiums for
those plans—and those plans only—to make
up for the lost cost-sharing money. Because the
amount that low-income enrollees can pay for
coverage is capped at roughly 10 percent of
their income, they are insulated from the resulting silver-plan premium spikes. In the
meantime, higher-income enrollees are encouraged to buy platinum, gold, or bronze
plans, whose prices have remained stable. Silver loading has thus protected enrollees and insurers from the full consequences of the loss of
cost-sharing payments (Dorn 2019).
Although the ACA now finances cost-
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sharing protections through a much different
mechanism than originally anticipated, the
ACA’s basic protections are intact. The big
loser is the public fisc. Not only does the federal government pay inflated premium subsidies to cover silver-loaded plans, but insurers
have also sued to recover the billions of dollars
in cost-sharing payments that they believe they
are owed. If they win—they have had success
so far, and the issue is now pending before the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—
they could recover more than $10 billion per
year.
By 2017, the courtroom assault against the
ACA appeared to have run its course. Such was
not to be. As part of the tax reform bill—more
on this in a moment—Congress effectively repealed the individual mandate by zeroing out
the tax penalty for going without insurance.
That spurred a group of red-state attorneys general to file a lawsuit, Texas v. United States, arguing that Congress created a constitutional defect in the ACA when it eliminated the mandate
penalty. In their view, the individual mandate—
the naked instruction to buy insurance—remained on the books, but could no longer be
defended as a tax. What is more, because the
Congress that adopted the ACA believed the individual mandate was essential to the law, the
constitutional defect required the entire ACA
to fall.
Lawyers from across the political spectrum
derided the lawsuit, in particular the claim that
fidelity to Congress’s intent required complete
invalidation of a statute that Congress spent
2017 trying, and failing, to repeal. But the case
was assigned to a conservative judge with a partisan reputation, and in late 2018, he declared
the entire law invalid. An appeal has been filed;
depending on how the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit rules, the case may work its
way to the Supreme Court sometime in 2020,
perhaps in time for the election.
Born to Fail

Several features of the ACA were designed so
poorly that they were doomed from the start.
The most conspicuous early change came when
Congress, in April 2011, repealed a requirement
that businesses submit a 1099 Form for every
business to which they paid more than $600 in
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the tax year. The anticipated compliance costs
were thought to be “disproportionate as compared with any resulting improvement in tax
compliance.”9 The Obama administration
hailed the repeal as “a big win for small business” (Mills 2011).
That was a minor change, however. Not so
the Obama administration’s determination in
October 2011 that it would not implement the
CLASS Act. As Secretary Kathleen Sebelius explained in a letter to Congress, she could not
devise a long-term benefit plan that would be
“both actuarially sound for the next 75 years
and consistent with the statutory requirements” (HHS 2011a). This was the sobering conclusion of a disaster that had unfolded in slow
motion. The goal of the CLASS Act was to offer
a public, voluntary insurance plan that would
help pay for supportive services to enable individuals with mild functional limitations to remain in the community rather than entering
nursing homes (for more, see Gleckman 2011,
2012). It was a worthy goal, and one that might
even have saved Medicaid some money in the
long run. Whether a simple plan—perhaps one
financed in part by beneficiary premiums and
in part by government funds, along the lines of
Medicare—might have been devised to meet
this goal remains open to debate. The CLASS
Act, however, contained two provisions that
presented insurmountable obstacles. The first,
included largely for political reasons, required
the program to be self-sustaining. The second
capped the premiums for low-income and student enrollees at an extremely low level, effectively requiring any better-off, nonstudent enrollees to pay even more for their coverage.
Squaring this circle was simply not possible.
What was the CLASS Act doing in the ACA?
As McDonough (2011) explains in detail, a version of the CLASS Act was originally introduced
by Senator Ted Kennedy in 2005. The policy had
powerful supporters as well as powerful opponents, and was controversial even among Dem8

ocrats, who disagreed about whether it should
be part of the ACA. Its inclusion may have had
something to do with the fact that the CLASS
Act gave the ACA’s CBO score a $70 billion
bump, accounting for the lion’s share of projected $123 billion in deficit reduction. Premiums for long-term insurance would start being
paid during the initial years of the program—
most significantly, during the ten-year budget
window that the CBO used to score the ACA—
but most outlays would be made much later.
Then Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell
was not far off the mark when he charged that
“the Class Act was a budget gimmick that might
enhance the numbers on a Washington bureaucrat’s spreadsheet but was destined to fail in
the real world” (Radnofsky 2011). Congress repealed the act in January 2013 as part of a bipartisan budget deal.10
Another quizzical feature of the ACA, at least
in retrospect, was the $6 billion in loans that it
appropriated to support the establishment of
“cooperative health plans.” A consolation prize
for the failure of the public option, cooperative
health plans were to be nonprofit entities governed by their members, modeled on the success of flourishing plans such as Group Health
in the Pacific Northwest and HealthPartners in
Minnesota and Wisconsin (James 2013). Because they would plow profits back into the
plans instead of distributing them to shareholders, and because of their consumer-
focused governance structure, the hope was
that they would offer an attractive insurance
option for at least a portion of the exchange
population.
The co-op program was troubled from the
start. Insurance is a tough business, and brand-
new co-ops generally lacked the wherewithal
and the financial reserves to compete with established insurers in a novel market. Neither
the co-ops’ nonprofit status nor their member-
driven governance structure made them better
than commercial insurers at pricing risk or de-

8. Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act of 2011,
Pub. L. 112–9, 125 Stat. 361 (2011).
9. Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy Overpayments Act, H.R.
112–16 (February 22, 2011), 6.
10. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112–240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013).
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signing health plans. At the behest of the insurance lobby, the ACA also saddled co-ops with
onerous restrictions. Co-ops could not move
into the employer-sponsored insurance market, for example, and could not use federal
funds to market their plans.
When the exchanges went live in 2014,
twenty-three co-ops participated. By January
2019, only four remained. The co-ops’ demise
was hastened by a hostile Republican Congress
and an Obama administration that hesitated to
support such a fragile group of insurers. In
budget negotiations in 2011, the Obama administration agreed to $2.2 billion in cuts to the
loan program; in 2013, it accepted a Republican
demand to end the program altogether (Markon 2013). The funding drawdown squeezed off
the establishment of new co-ops. Then, in late
2014, Congress adopted an appropriations rider
limiting the funds available under the “risk corridor” program.11 The loss of risk corridor funding drove many thinly capitalized co-ops into
insolvency (CCIIO 2015; Jost 2016). Thus the co-
ops did not fail on their own; they were pushed.
But there was never any good reason to think
they would succeed.
Interest-Group Pressure

Even as lawsuits and repeal efforts played out
on the front page, powerful interest groups
have quietly lobbied Congress, with some success, to dismantle portions of the ACA that
threaten their bottom lines. Most of the resulting changes affect financing: either the repeal
or delay of taxes, or the reversal of anticipated
funding cuts. The changes have not threatened
the basic operation of the ACA’s coverage expansions, and they have generally commanded
bipartisan support.
The most noteworthy change has been the
delay of the so-called Cadillac tax. An excise tax
of 40 percent of the employer contributions to
health plans over a certain threshold (initially
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$10,200 for an individual or $27,500 for a family,
growing over time with inflation), the Cadillac
tax was initially supposed to take effect in 2018.
It was not designed primarily to raise revenue
but instead to correct a distortion created by
the tax code’s exclusion of health insurance
from employee wages. That distortion encourages employers to expand insurance offerings
at the expense of wages, which in turn dulls
employers’ incentives to constrain health-care
spending (for more, see Glied and Striar 2016).
Perhaps more than any single feature of the
ACA, the Cadillac tax held the most promise for
slowing spending growth over time. But large
employers and unions hated it (Goodnough
2019). Although the nickname evokes a tax only
on the richest of the rich, in fact the tax would
have affected one-fifth of employers in 2022 and
more than one-third by 2030. That’s because
the thresholds at which the tax was imposed
would grow with general inflation—much
slower, typically, than the growth of health insurance premiums (Rae, Claxton, and Levitt
2019). In December 2015, Congress delayed the
law for two years and did so again in February
2018.12 In July 2019, a Democratic-controlled
House of Representatives voted to repeal the
Cadillac tax, leading many observers to doubt
that it will ever take effect (Goodnough 2019).
A similar dynamic has played out with two
other taxes. Starting in 2013, the ACA imposed
an excise tax on the sale of any medical device
(Kramer and Kesselheim 2013). Congress, however, adopted a moratorium on its collection
for 2015 and 2016 and adopted another two-year
moratorium in 2018.13 The collection of an ACA-
imposed annual tax on health insurers was also
suspended for two separate one-year periods.14
And, as of this writing, Congress appears poised
to repeal both taxes—along with the Cadillac
tax—as part of a 2019 budget deal (Sullivan
2019). The legislature has been similarly irresolute when it comes to the ACA’s cuts to Medic-

11. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. 113–235, 128 Stat. 2130 (2014).
12. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114–113, 129 Stat. 2242 (2014), div. Q, §174; Suspension of
Certain Health-Related Taxes, Pub. L. 115–120, 132 Stat. 28 (2018), div. D, §4002.
13. Suspension of Certain Health-Related Taxes, §4001.
14. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, title II, §201; Suspension of Certain Health-Related Taxes, §4003.
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aid’s disproportionate share payments, ultimately delaying most of them through 2025.15
The Independent Payment Advisory Board
(IPAB) was another casualty of interest-group
pressure. The IPAB was originally supposed to
be a board of fifteen Senate-confirmed appointees. When Medicare cost growth exceeded certain targets, the board would recommend cuts
to bring Medicare spending into line. Unless
the secretary of HHS offered an alternative slate
of cuts, or Congress intervened, those cuts
would automatically take effect. Though the
Obama administration never nominated anyone to serve on IPAB, the HHS secretary was
authorized to wield the board’s powers in their
absence.
In the ACA’s early years, IPAB authorities
were not triggered because of an unexpected
slowdown in per capita Medicare spending
growth—a slowdown that may or may not have
been due to the ACA (Chandra, Holmes, and
Skinner 2013). But because the Medicare targets
looked as if they might be exceeded in 2017 or
2018, IPAB came under intense fire from the
hospital, physician, and pharmaceutical lobbies (McDonough 2017; Oberlander and Spivack 2018). At their behest, and without much
fanfare, Congress repealed the IPAB in a 2018
budget bill.16
“Free choice vouchers,” championed by Senator Ron Wyden, were also a casualty of interest-
group lobbying. These vouchers would have allowed employees whose employer-sponsored
health coverage cost more than 8 percent of
their income to secure a voucher from their employers to buy coverage on the exchange.
Among other things, free choice vouchers
would have solved the so-called family glitch,
which arises when family coverage for an employee is unaffordable, but family members are
still ineligible for premium subsidies. Subject
to lobbying from business organizations who
claimed that the vouchers would destabilize

employer risk pools, Congress repealed the program in 2011).17
All of these changes notwithstanding, most
of the tax increases and spending cuts included
in the ACA are still in place. Cuts to Medicare
Advantage plans and the adjustment to the annual increase in Medicare hospital reimbursement remain intact. So too are the ACA’s new
taxes on the payrolls and investment income of
high earners, as well as a sizable tax on drug
manufacturers. Powerful groups often get their
way in Washington, but not always.
Failure to Thrive

Some parts of the ACA have never been implemented, were implemented years later than anticipated, or simply failed to live up to expectations—not necessarily because they were
politically controversial, though some were, but
because they were starved for funds, were hard
to implement, or were not given high priority.
Consider, for example, the Prevention and
Public Health Fund. The ACA appropriated almost $19 billion for this fund between 2010 and
2022 and an additional $2 billion per year after
that. Beginning in 2012, however, Congress began chipping away at these funds, redirecting
them to other uses or cutting them outright
(Haberkorn 2012). In each of fiscal years 2015
through 2019, the fund’s actual appropriations
have been less than half the $2 billion originally
envisaged by the law (Lister 2017). Numerous
other new grant programs authorized by the
ACA have not received any appropriations (Redhead et al. 2017).
Also defunct is a provision to foster the sale
of health insurance across state lines. Section
1333 of Title I instructs HHS, by “not later than
July 1, 2013,” to issue rules allowing for two or
more states to enter into “health care choice
compacts.” These compacts would allow a single health plan to be sold in all of the agreeing
states. But HHS has not issued or even pro-

15. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112–240; Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Pub. L. 113–67; Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113–93, 128 Stat. 1040 (2014); Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114–10, 129 Stat. 87 (2015), 42 USC 1305; Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub.
L. 115–123, 132 Stat. 64 (2018).
16. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, div. E, §52001.
17. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. 112–10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011),
§1858.
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posed the required rules, partly because no
state has passed a law authorizing interstate
compacts and partly because insurers have expressed little interest in offering such plans. In
March 2019, keen to explore the possibility, the
Trump administration released a “request for
information” about how it could use 1333 to facilitate such sales (CMS 2019, 8657). For now,
however, Section 1333 is a dead letter.
A similar provision, Section 1334, orders the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to contract with health insurers to offer at least two
“multi-State qualified health plans through
each Exchange in each State” by 2017. The idea
was that federal employees receive high-quality
coverage through OPM, and that consumers on
the exchanges should have similar options.
OPM did issue rules to implement the provision (HHS 2011b, 53904), and for a few years
worked with Blue Cross to offer multistate
plans in about two-thirds of the states. Consumers did not flock to the plans, however, nor
did the plans much appeal to insurers, which
had to design multistate provider networks and
secure approval from each state in which they
operated, plus OPM. By 2017, only one OPM
contract remained in effect—with Arkansas
Blue Cross—and the Trump administration announced in April 2019 that it would stop administering the multistate program altogether
(Baker 2019).
Title VII of the ACA was largely the Biologic
Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCI),
an effort to create more competition for biologic drugs by creating a streamlined mechanism for approving follow-on products. But
BPCI has not lived up to expectations. In general, the generic drug industry works as well as
it does because small-molecule compounds are
easy to copy and cheap to manufacture. Biologics, in contrast, are large-molecule, protein-
based drugs, and they are exquisitely difficult
to replicate. By one estimate, developing a “biosimilar” costs somewhere between $100 million and $250 million (Blackstone and Joseph
2013). Further, a biosimilar will not be biologically identical to the brand-name drug; for approval, it only needs to be “highly similar.” The
lack of perfect substitutability may limit clini18. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, §747.
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cal use of biosimilars, reducing the incentives
to invest in their development.
To date, the FDA has approved only eighteen
biosimilar applications, ten of which have not
been marketed. Even where biosimilars are on
the market, “competition has been thin and
price reductions modest” (Atteberry et al. 2019).
The slow pace of approvals may be an intrinsic
feature of a market plagued by high fixed costs
and imperfect substitutability. Some research,
however, indicates that European countries offer a more hospitable environment for biosimilars, perhaps because centralized buyers can
credibly play competing drug manufacturers
against one another (Morton, Stern, and Stern
2018). Whatever the case may be, the ACA’s
drafters did not attend to the full range of challenges associated with biosimilars in the United
States.
Other parts of the ACA have taken many
years to implement. Take the rule requiring
chain restaurants to include calorie counts in
their menus and menu boards. Subject to furious lobbying by the food industry, the FDA took
four years to finalize its calorie-count rule, its
original effective date set for December 1, 2015
(HHS 2014, 71156). But it soon extended that effective date by a year (HHS 2015, 39675). Shortly
after, Congress prohibited the FDA from implementing or enforcing the rule until one year
after issuing new guidance about it.18 When the
FDA issued that guidance in May 2016, the new
effective date became May 2017 (HHS 2016b,
96364). Four days before the new effective date,
however, the Trump administration’s FDA announced another delay (HHS 2017, 20825). Only
under litigation pressure did the rule finally go
into effect in May 2018, more than eight years
after the ACA’s adoption (Gottlieb 2017).
The Obama administration also moved
slowly in implementing Section 1557 of the
ACA, which prohibits discrimination in “any
health program or activity” that receives federal
funds on the grounds of race, color, national
origin, sex, age, or disability (for an overview of
health equity provisions, see Grogan 2017; for
background on the legal framework extended
by Section 1557, see Rosenbaum and Schmucker
2017). It took six years for HHS to release a rule
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that, among other things, clarified that discrimination on the basis of sex included discrimination on the basis of gender identity and pregnancy status (HHS 2016a, 31376). Soon after,
however, a Texas judge—the same judge who
declared the entire ACA invalid—entered a nationwide injunction against those aspects of
the rule. On taking office, the Trump administration said it would revise the rule. Not until
May 2019, however, did it release a proposal
(HHS 2019, 27846), and no rule has been finalized as of this writing.
One last example. As a condition of taking
advantage of the tax exclusion for employer-
sponsored health coverage, the ACA prohibits
firms from discriminating in favor of highly
compensated employees.19 Previously, that prohibition applied only to firms that self-insured,
not those that purchased commercial insurance. In 2011, however, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) decided that the ACA’s new prohibition would not take effect until the agency
issues rules to implement it (IRS Notice 2011–1).
The IRS has yet to do so.
Executive-Branch Sabotage

The 2016 election ushered in a new era for the
ACA, one in which the Trump administration
has sought to undermine the law. President
Trump is not subtle about this. On his first day
in office, he issued an executive order instructing his agencies “to waive, defer, grant exemptions from, or delay the implementation of any
provision or requirement of the Act that would
impose a fiscal burden” (White House 2017).
Even after congressional Republicans failed to
repeal the law, Trump claimed that “we are getting rid of Obamacare” (Rappaport 2018).
But presidents cannot rewrite statutes and,
with one big exception, the ACA remains firmly
in place. That exception, of course, is the individual mandate. In the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,
Congress, with the Trump administration’s full-
throated support, eliminated the mandate by
zeroing out the penalty for going without insurance.20 As a result, CBO estimates that about

four million fewer people will be uninsured in
2019 than had the individual mandate remained in place, and thirteen million fewer in
2027. Prices for individual insurance are expected to rise 10 percent faster each year relative to the baseline (CBO 2017).
At the same time, eliminating the mandate
spurred the Texas v. United States lawsuit. Although it was the nominal defendant, the
Trump administration announced that it would
not mount a defense of the mandate’s constitutionality—a decision that broke with the Justice
Department’s long-standing, bipartisan tradition of defending federal laws if any reasonable
argument can be made in their defense. Initially, the Trump administration took the view
that the proper remedy for the mandate’s unconstitutionality was the invalidation of the
ACA’s rules about guaranteed issue and community rating—in effect, the protections for
people with preexisting conditions. In March
2019, however, the administration changed its
view and announced that it now agreed with
the Texas judge that the entire ACA had to fall.
Reporting confirms that the legal maneuvers
were politically motivated: White House officials apparently believed that “taking a bold
stance would force Congress into repealing and
replacing the law” (Johnson and Everett 2019).
The refusal to defend the ACA is perhaps the
clearest example of Trump administration sabotage. It is not the only one, however. Of greatest significance, HHS has approved waivers allowing nine states to impose work requirements
on their Medicaid expansion populations, with
nine additional waivers still pending. The
agency claims that the waivers advance Medicaid’s purposes because they enable states to
test whether work incentives conduce to enrollees’ health. HHS, however, granted waivers to
states that did not supply evaluation protocols,
suggesting that work requirements are not
meant to test anything (Levey 2019). More important, little evidence indicates that work requirements in other programs effectively spur
beneficiaries to work (Falk, McCarty, and Aus-

19. 42 U.S. Code §300-16: Prohibition on discrimination in favor of highly compensated individuals, Pub. L.
111–148, 124 Stat. 135 (2011).
20. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115–97, 31 Stat. 2054 (2018), §11081.
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senberg 2014), and there is no good reason to
think that they will function better in Medicaid.
Most beneficiaries already work (60 percent)
and, of those who do not, about 80 percent are
disabled, ill, caring for family members, or in
school (Musumeci, Garfield, and Rudowitz
2018).
Work requirements, however, are very good
at pruning the Medicaid rolls. Many beneficiaries—even those who work the requisite
hours—struggle to cope with the burden of
documenting their work history. In Arkansas,
for example, only 12 percent of people subject
to the work requirements reported at least
eighty hours of qualifying activities; as a result,
more than eighteen thousand lost coverage in
the program’s first nine months (Rudowitz, Musumeci, and Hall 2019). Work requirements are
thus best understood as an attempt to undo the
ACA’s transformation of Medicaid—to make it
a program that, as before, is open only to the
“deserving poor.” For that reason, the courts
have pushed back. In declaring three of those
waivers invalid, a judge in Washington, D.C.,
held that HHS could not exercise its waivers
authority “to refashion the program Congress
designed in any way they choose.” As of this
writing, the case is on appeal to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
The Trump administration has also issued
two rules that attempt to exploit loopholes in
the ACA. The first involves its redefinition of
the phrase “short-term, limited duration insurance.” Originally meant to cover temporary
breaks in coverage, short-term insurance is exempt from most ACA rules, including those
that prohibit discrimination against the sick
and mandate the coverage of essential health
benefits. The Trump administration, however,
has issued a final rule defining it to include
plans that offer coverage for up to 364 days in a
year and are renewable for up to three years
(HHS 2018b, 38212). The professed goal is to
“promote consumer choice” and “enhance affordability of coverage for individual consumers.” In a sense, the rule will achieve that goal:
short-term insurance will be cheaper than ACA-
compliant coverage for the young and healthy.
It achieves that goal only, however, by undermining the ACA’s effort to spread health risk
across a broad population. Siphoning young
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and healthy people from the exchanges will divide the common risk pool, potentially destabilizing the insurance markets for the sick and
elderly who have no choice but to buy insurance
on the exchanges. The new rule may also be illegal. Though HHS has some interpretive discretion, it is difficult to see how plans that last
99.7 percent as long as conventional insurance
are short term in any sense of the phrase. So
far, however, a lawsuit pressing that argument
has not met with success: in July 2019, a district
court in Washington, D.C., held that the rule
was valid. That case has also been appealed.
The second rule is of a piece with the first.
Under federal law, small businesses can band
together to form association health plans for
their employees. Because those plans are
treated as employer-sponsored coverage, they
are exempt from the ACA’s underwriting restrictions, though they must still cover the essential
health benefits. Originally, only those businesses in the same line of work, or those that
had some other common interest independent
of the provision of insurance, could band together. The Trump administration, however,
adopted a rule that greatly expanded the ability
of employers—and even individuals running
their own businesses—to form association
health plans (DOL 2018, 28912). As with the rule
governing short-term insurance, the goal is to
enable healthier-than-average employees and
individuals to exit the shared risk pool, potentially destabilizing it. Again, as with the short-
term rule, it is probably unlawful. In March
2019, a judge in Washington, D.C., held that the
rule “was intended and designed to end run the
requirements of the ACA, but it does so only by
ignoring the language and purpose of both
ERISA and the ACA.” An appeal is in the works.
Beyond these two rules, the Trump administration has taken other steps to undermine
the exchanges. The decision to cut off the cost-
sharing subsidies was driven not by a cool evaluation of the legal merits of the claim that the
requisite money had not been appropriated. It
was a political decision, made on the eve of
open enrollment, in a manner calculated to sow
confusion (Bagley 2017). The Trump administration has cut funding in half for the ACA’s
“navigators,” who are meant to help people enroll for coverage (Pollitz, Tolbert, and Diaz
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2019), and nearly all (90 percent) used to advertise for open enrollment (Kliff 2017). It also
threatened to halt $5.2 billion in risk adjustment transfers between exchange insurers, before backing down in the face of insurer outrage
(Bagley 2018; HHS 2018a, 36456).
Do all of these actions, taken together, constitute a deliberate campaign to sabotage an act
of Congress—one that oversteps the administration’s authority? To be sure, the administration resists that description: in any particular
case, it claims to be exercising discretion within
the four corners of the ACA, not working to impair it (Council of Economic Advisors 2019).
The record, however, suggests otherwise. Some
of the Trump administration’s implementation
decisions have been declared unlawful; others
may be defensible in a narrow legal sense, but
nonetheless deliberately aim to enfeeble the
law in an effort to pave the way for its repeal
(Bagley and Gluck 2018). For now, the administration’s actions have done limited damage to
the ACA. This is partly because some of the administration’s moves have been snarled in the
courts, and partly because some of them—such
as the measures described that may destabilize
the exchange risk pool—are likely to cause
more damage over time. Some states have also
acted to offset the potentially de-stabilizing effects of the Trump administration’s actions on
insurance markets by using waivers to continue
reinsurance programs beyond their original
three-year time frame (Blumenthal et al. 2018).
The ACA’s future is uncertain, however, and depends a great deal on the coming election.
Li m i tat i o n s

Our assessment of the ACA’s progress is far
from definitive. One limitation is the relatively
subjective nature of our coding scheme. Although we tried to provide as objective an assessment as possible of the implementation
progress of each provision, it is certainly possible to take issue with some of our decisions.

Recognizing this limitation, we have been as
transparent as possible by making all of our
coding, and the sources on which it is based,
available as supplementary materials.21
Our thematic discussion is limited not only
by a similar inevitable subjectivity but also by
the inherent difficulty of assigning a single
“cause of death” to provisions that may in fact
have died from multiple complex causes. For
example, the CLASS Act as structured was born
to fail, but only because of partisan and interest-
group pressure to structure the act in a certain
way (Gleckman 2012). Similarly, analysis of the
politics of the Prevention and Public Health
Fund suggest that partisan and interest-group
pressure partly explains why it has not thrived
(Fraser 2019). But politics is not always the root
cause of a provision’s failure, even if it played
a role: both the demise of the co-ops and the
lackluster effort to promote biosimilars seem
victims of underlying market forces rather than
political pressures.
We also believe it is still too early to render
a final determination as to which parts of the
law have thrived and which will fail. Many other
shoes are still to drop and, in the grand scheme
of things, ten years may not be long enough for
a major reform such as the ACA to take its final
shape, let alone for scholars to discern its
broader significance in reshaping the policy
and political landscape.22 Our assessment is unavoidably an interim one.
C o n c lu s i o n

What, then, is left of the Affordable Care Act
after ten years? Most of it. Of greatest moment,
the ACA has successfully expanded the Medicaid program in more than two-thirds of the
states, extending coverage to millions of individuals at or near the poverty level. Not one of
those states has walked away from the expansion; indeed, a recent string of successful ballot
initiatives in deep-red states—Idaho, Nebraska,
Maine, and Utah—suggests that Medicaid is

21. Available at https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/6/2/42/tab-supplemental.
22. Medicaid was not implemented in all fifty states until 1982, seventeen years after it was enacted. Jonathan
Oberlander’s definitive study of the politics of Medicare was published nearly forty years afterward (2003). These
things take time.
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more popular with the American public than
commonly appreciated.
On the individual market, the ACA still protects people with preexisting conditions; it still
requires every insurer to cover the full range of
essential health benefits; and it still subsidizes,
through premium subsidies, the purchase of
individual coverage. The exchanges have remained stable, even as premiums have surged
in response to Trump administration sabotage.
Reforms that apply to people who get health
insurance through their jobs have similarly endured. Employers cannot discriminate on the
basis of health status, they cannot impose lifetime or annual caps, and they must allow children to stay on their parents’ plans until they
turn twenty-six.
Nor have the law’s revenue-raising and
budget-cutting provisions been wiped away.
Most of the ACA’s taxes are still in place. The
ACA’s multibillion dollar Medicare cuts have
also been allowed to take effect, though the repeal of the IPAB and the repeated delays of cuts
to disproportionate share hospital payments
suggest that Congress remains imperfectly
committed to budget cuts. Significantly, the
relatively modest changes that Congress has
made to the ACA’s financing mechanisms have
resulted from low-profile and often bipartisan
legislative action, not as a consequence of the
partisan war over health reform.
For all its resilience, however, the ACA is not
the same law it was on the day it was enacted.
Three major changes stand out. First, the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB has allowed
fourteen states to decline to expand their Medicaid programs, depriving millions of people of
coverage the ACA originally offered. Second,
Congress has reduced the penalty associated
with the individual mandate to zero, hampering
to some extent the law’s ability to spread risk
across a broad population. Third, the Trump administration terminated the cost-sharing payments, forcing insurers to adjust their plan offerings and altering how the ACA subsidizes
private coverage for low-income people.
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None of these is a minor tweak; all are significant and substantial deviations from how
the ACA was supposed to work. Nor is the ACA
out of the woods. Texas v. United States represents an existential threat to the law, even if the
lawsuit is ultimately unlikely to succeed. And
though Medicaid work requirements and the
rule governing short-term, limited duration
plans have faced legal challenges, the courts
may yet approve them. If they do, they could
undermine the ACA in states that remain opposed to the law. The ultimate success or failure
of Trump-era sabotage may thus depend on the
outcome of those cases—and on the 2020 presidential election.
For now, however, the ACA has proven resilient. It has been bruised; it has been battered;
but it is still here. Its durability is all the more
remarkable because the Obama administration
could not turn to a Republican-controlled Congress to address unexpected implementation
challenges. That’s not generally the case with
complex legislation. In 1965, for example, a
Democratic-controlled Congress passed the
law creating Medicare and Medicaid over
staunch Republican opposition,23 but the subsequent implementation of Medicare was quite
swift and relatively smooth (Gluck and Reno
2001). By 1972, Democrats and Republicans
were cooperating to expand Medicare to the
disabled, to constrain higher-than-expected
spending, and to address administrative difficulties.24
The ACA has not been so fortunate. Even ten
years in, it remains the object of intense partisan conflict. The law’s rough edges have therefore never been smoothed out. The family
glitch, for example, is unpopular across the political spectrum, but has not been addressed.
Congress could have appropriated the necessary money to make the promised cost-sharing
payments but has chosen not to do so. All of
these changes and more might have come to
pass in a less dysfunctional political system.
Instead, the basic features of the ACA have
been locked into place since 2010. That situa-

23. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 89–97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965)
24. Adjustment of the Contribution and Benefit Base, Pub. L. 92–336, 86 Stat. 406 (1972).
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tion is likely to persist. The collapse of the 2017
repeal effort suggests that Republicans will
never muster the political will to undo the law,
much less to pass some yet-to-be-determined
alternative. But it seems equally likely that
Democrats (who are themselves divided) will

not have the political muscle to replace the law
with an ambitious version of Medicare for All.
From where we stand today, it looks like the
ACA—older now, but not much worse for
wear—will shape the health-care system for
many years to come.

Table A1. Timeline of Key ACA Events
2009

August

2010

December 24
January
March 11
March 21
March 23
March 30

2011

November
January
April 14

2012

June

2014
2017

January
January
July
December

Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) dies. Paul Kirk, also a Democrat, is
appointed to replace him until a special election can be held.
Senate passes PPACA (H.R. 3590) with sixty votes.
Republican Scott Brown wins the special election to the U.S. Senate from
Massachusetts.
Reconciliation process used to get bill out of Senate.
“Manager’s Amendment” (Title X) makes changes to the law.
House passes Senate version of the bill 219-212.
President Obama signs PPACA into law.
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) makes additional
modifications to the law. PPACA as amended by HCERA (that is, the law that
existed at this point) is typically considered the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
Midterm elections; Republicans take control of the House.
H.R. 2, Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act introduced by House
Republicans.
The first repeal of an ACA provision: Title IX, Section 9006: Expansion of
information reporting requirements (1099 reporting provision).
SCOTUS decision in NFIB v. Sebelius upholds individual mandate, makes
Medicaid expansion optional for states.
Coverage provisions (both private and Medicaid) take effect.
Trump inaugurated.
Republican attempts to repeal ACA fail in the Senate (51–49 vote).
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reduces individual mandate penalty to $0.

Source: Authors’ tabulation.
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